. . . a disaster that decided the course of the history of Surabaya and also the course of our freedom struggle throughout Indonesia.1 
By c o i n c i d e n c e , I had also c o m m e n c e d a study of this epis o d e and have r e c e n t l y come into p o s s e s s i o n of n e w ev i d e n c e w h i c h differs in one or two impo r t a n t aspects from the A b d u l g a n i v e r s i o n . 3
It is the aim of this p a p e r to i n v e s t i g a t e the c i r c u m s t a n c e s of B r i g a d i e r M a l l a b y fs d e a t h in the light of the e v idence at my di s p o s a l and h o p e f u l l y to find the a n swers to the f o l l o w i n g questions:
1.
Who gave the troops of "D" Coy, 6 M a h r a t t a (who w e r e in the I n t e r n a t The J a p a n e s e c a p
i t u l a t e d on A u g u s t 15, 1945, after the d r o p p i n g of atomic bombs r e s p e c t i v e l y on H i r o s h i m a (August 6) and N a g a s a k i (August 9).
H owever, b e t w e e n the date of the E m p e r o r Ts a n n o u n c e m e n t of J a p a n 1s a c c e p t a n c e of the A l l i e s 1 d e m a n d for u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u r r e n der and the arrival of the first A l l i e d (British) troops in Jakarta, there was a hiatus of 41 days.
It is not w i t h i n the scope of this p a p e r to di s c u s s ful l y the reasons for this delay, w h i c h was p erhaps the m o s t impo r t a n t single factor a f f e c t i n g e v e r y t h i n g that took pl a c e subse q u e n t l y . But it is clear that d u r i n g this si x -w e e k p e r i o d the I n d o n e s i a n r e v o l u t i o n a r y g o v e r n m e n t was able to e s t a b l i s h itself and gain an a s c e n d a n c y over the J a p a n e s e o c c u p a t i o n forces, a m a j o r part of w h i c h b e c a m e t h o r o u g h l y d emora l i z e d .
In Surabaya, news of the P r o c l a m a t i o n of I n d e p e n d e n c e was first he a r d on Saturday, A u g u s t 18, over Radio J a p a n w h i c h had be e n t aken over by p e m u d a g r o u p s . 5
It was only on the next M o n d a y that the full text of the P r o k l a m a s i I n d onesia M e r d e k a was first p u b l i s h e d in the n e w s p a p e r S o e a r a A s i a .6 c o m p l e t e l y impotent. In a ddition, a large amount of arms and a m m u n i tion was h a n d e d over by or seized from the J a p a n e s e and d i s t r i b u t e d among the p o p u l a t i o n . 7
The f o l l o w i n g " p r o g r e s s char t " gives, in outline, the sequ e n c e of events w It had not ta k e n part in the su b s e q u e n t X I V A r m y c a m p a i g n w h i c h c l e a r e d the J a p a n e s e f rom Burma. D u r i n g this c a m p a i g n 23 D i v i s i o n was in t r a i n i n g for its role in the p r o p o s e d amph i b i o u s a ssault on S i n g a por e and M a l a y a p l a n n e d for A u g u s t 1 9 4 5 --c o d e-named Z i p p e r . 16
Anderson. The narrative has been translated by Mrs. Willing of the Japanese De partment of Monash University. A significant aspect of this account is its close similarity to the Huijer report (P. J. G. Huijer, ' ' Report on the Surabaja Affair," IC-RVO, doc. no. 007177-007179). There has been a tendency among obser vers of this period to dismiss the Huijer report as unreliable because of its supposedly exaggerated pro-Dutch bias.
In fact, most of the events described by" Huijer are verified by this Japanese account. 12. Huijer, '' Report" ; Abdulgani, Seratus Hari, p. 22.
13. Anderson, Java, p. 157.
14. ''Besides that, the Angkatan Muda with its branches in each government agencyrailways, electricity, radio, education, and others--were already active. There were also workers1 organizations with their militia; and the youth and militia of the Surabaya ulama. All these plus the mothers and daughters who ran the pub lic kitchens and medical posts ensured that Surabaya at that time was a strong unified fortress." Abdulgani, Seratus Hari, p. 24. See also note 8 above.
On the s u r r e n d e r of the J a p a n e s e , the o p e r a t i o n wen t ahead as p l a n n e A c c o r d i n g to one of his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , he wa s "a h i g h l y i n telligent, quiet, pl e a s a n t , u n a s s u m i n g o f f i c e r . " 17 He h ad b e e n a staff o f f icer for m o s t of the war, his last a p p o i n t m e n t b e i n g D i r e c t o r of M i l i t a r y O p e r a t i o n s (DMO) at G e n e r a l H e a d q u a r t e r s , I n d i a > in Delhi.
In this c a p a c i t y he had bee n one of A d m i r a l M o u n t b a t t e n *s chi e f advis e r s w h e n he was a p p o i n t e d S u p r e m e A l l i e d C o m m a n d e r S outh East A s i a . 18
As DMO, he had bee n a m a j o r general, so he had d r o p p e d r a n k to take up the 49 Br i g a d e a p p o i n t ment.
He had not seen a c t i o n w i t h the brigade; in fact he had never p r e v i o u s l y h e l d an o p e r a t i o n a l command.
It is, perhaps, one of the m a n y t r a This lack of e f f e c t i v e i n t e l l i g e n c e r e g a r d i n g the s i t u a t i o n in J a v a c ould be traced b a c k to the t r a n s f e r of r e s p o n s i b i l ity for the N e t h e r l a n d s East Indies from M a c A r t h u r 's S o u t h -W e s t Pa c i f i c A r e a C o m m a n d to M o u n t b a t t e n 1s So u t h East A s i a Co m m a n d on A u g u s t 15, 1945.
In a m u c h q u o t e d e x tract f r o m his Report, M o u n t b a t t e n states:
Having taken over the NEI from the South-West Pacific Area without any Intelligence reports, I had been given no hint of the political situation which had arisen in Java. It was known of course, that an Indonesian Movement had been in existence before the war; and that it had been supported by prominent intellectuals, some of whom had suffered banishment for their participation in nationalist propaganda--but no information had been made available to me as to the fate of this movement under the Japanese occupation. Dr. H. J. van Mook, Lieut-Governor-General of the NEI who had come to Kandy on 1st September, had given me no reason to suppose that the reoccupation of Java would present any operational problem beyond that of rounding up the Japanese.21 Assuming the danger to the Brigade was now over, General Hawthorn, together with Sukarno and his party, emplaned for Jakarta about 2 p.m.
One of the factors w h i c h did not seem to be a p p r e c i a t e d by those o u t s i d e S u r a b a y a was
the lack of control on the part of Indone s i a n about the possible danger to himself in appearing to '' support" British inten tions. As it happened, he did not broadcast.
Instead there were inflammatory calls from Radio Surabaya for a general uprising.
Accounts differ as to the numbers of the forces engaged. Abdulgani (Seratus
Hari, p. 32) gives the British forces as 6,000-certainly an overestimate. He does not give the strength of the Indonesian side. Wehl (The Birth of Indonesia, p. 55) estimates the Indonesian force at "20,000 armed and Japanese-trained regu lar troops supported by tanks and an uncontrolled mob of about 120,000 armed with rifles, swords and spears. ..." Anderson, who certainly cannot be re garded as an enthusiastic advocate of the British cause, puts the 49 Brigade strength at 4,000 which, he states, was attacked by an "estimated 120,000 pemu da" (Anderson, Java, p. 161). The Mansergh Report gives the estimated strength of the Indonesian forces as: "TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakjat), 15,000; Police, 800; Mob, 75,000 (armed with rifles, and 25,000 spearmen); with a further 5,000 TKR available outside." Whatever the figure, it is clear that troops of 49 Brigade, most of whom were dispersed all over the city, were greatly outnumbered. leaders over their followers. 
As Pugh put it, MThey [the B r i t i s h High Command] a c c e p t e d the a s s u r a n c e s of Sukarno and other leaders w i t h o u t fu r t h e r question, little r e a l i s i n g their inab i l i t y to hold the f a n a t i cal and e x c i t e d m a

He then r e t u r n e d to B r i g a d e H e a d q u a r t e r s . However, h e a r i n g of an o t h e r v i o l a tion of the truce, he sent his b r i g a d e m a j o r and a M a j o r H arte (who had come fro m J a k a r t a w i t h S u k a r n o 's party) to pr o t e s t to the I n d o n e sian H e a d q u a r t e r s some three h u n d r e d yards away. T hese two o f f icers w e r e arrested, and later s e ized and shot by the m o b . 27
At 4:00 p.m. yet a n o t h e r u r g e n t signal was r e c e i v e d from M a j o r V e n u Gopal that he was a g a i n bei n g c l o s e l y invested.
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the fact* that his b r i g a d e m a j o r and M a j o r Ha r te had not r e t u r n e d from their mission, B r i g a d i e r M a l l a b y d e c i d e d once mor e to intervene p e r sonally.
He p r e p a r e d to set out on his last journey. 
g a n i in his S u r a b a i a P o s t series and, from the B r i t i s h point of view, the report of C a p t a i n R. C. S m i t h , 28 w i t h two s u p p o r t i n g letters e x p l a i n i n g s p e c i f i c points in it.
S u p e r i mposed, as it were, on these two acc o u n t s is that of M a j o r K. V e n u Gopal who was at the ''r e c e i v i n g e n d " in I n t e r n a t io Square. It is certain that this sudden burst of fire caused many casualties among the crowd and to our pemuda. I saw several sprawled on the ground dead or severely wounded.
His story is vital in that it throws light on w h a t h a p p e n e d inside the Bank B u i l d i n g just p rior to the o u t b r e a k of shooting. To f a c i l i t a t e a c o m p a r a t i v e study of the vital p e r i o d b e t w e e n a p p r o x i m a t e l y
In the middle of the chaos and confusion in which there was a danger we could be killed, we scattered and sought shelter individually. Pak Sungkono, Tjak Doel Arnowo, Dr. Mursito (son-in-law of Pak Dirman) Kusnandar and I, crouching to avoid the bullets, jumped straight into the Kali Mas and sheltered beside its banks. A moment later we were followed by several pemuda and other people whom we did not know, some among them bleeding from wounds from British bullets. . . . The firing from the building increased in intensity and also the retaliatory fire from our people and pemuda. . . . "Don't know. There was a grenade which exploded in the car, but there were some people from our side who fired at the car," continued the pemuda.
We were rather stunned [agak kaget] at hearing the pemudafs story and we in structed him:
As soon as the firing started, the three of us who were in the car crouched down on the floor as far as possible.
An Indonesian came up to the Brigadier's window with a rifle. He fired four shots at the three of us, all of which missed. He then went away while we shammed dead. The battle went on for about two and a half hours, to about 2030 hrs, by which time it was dark. At the end of that time, the firing died down to some ex tent, and we could hear shouting as though the Indonesians were being col lected. Two of them came up to the car and attempted to drive it away. That failed and one of them opened the back door on the Brigadier's side. The Brigadier moved, and as they saw from that that he was still alive, he spoke to them and asked to be taken to one of the party leaders. The two Indonesians went away to discuss this, and one of them came back to the front door on the Briga dier's side. The Brigadier spoke to him again, the Indonesian answered, and then 37. Abdulgani therefore categorically states that the troops of "D" Coy fired on the convoy, which was about 100 yards away from the building. Compare Major Venu Gopal's statement below. 
This in fact is
The S t a t e m e n t s of K u n d a n , M u h a m m a d and M a j o r V e n u Gopal
In A r t i c l e 8 of his series, A b d u l g a n i gives an acco u n t of i n t e r vi e w s he had w i t h K u n d a n and M u h a m m a d . 112 K u n d a n s t a t e d that w h i l e he was s t a n d i n g close to B r i g a d i e r Mallaby's car he h i m s e l f h e a r d B r i g a d i e r M a l l a b y order C a p t a i n Shaw to go into the b u i lding, wai t ten minu t e s , and if the crowd in front of the b u i l d i n g c o uld not be c a l m e d down, they ("D" Coy) were to open fire. K u n d a n " r e m e m b e r s the r e a c t i o n " of C a p t a i n Shaw, who said this w o u l d be v e r y d a n g e r o u s for B r i g a d i e r M a l l a b y h i m s e l f but that the b r i g a d i e r c o n s i d e r e d that, as a m i l i t a r y officer, he could not accept the s u r r e n der terms of the Indonesians. This v e r s i o n is c o n t r a d i c t e d by Captain Smith.
In a letter to me (dated F e b r u a r y 20, 1974) he wrote: Going back to my report, the position of all of us was very closely grouped around one car so that there was only a matter of a very few feet between us. Therefore, Brigadier Mallaby was certainly able to hear when Captain Shaw agreed to the demands of the mob, which was why he was able to countermand it immediately. As I said, he then changed his mind in the hope that some of the men at least might reach safety, but the orders that he When Brig. Mallaby (BM) left after his first visit armed Indone sians again started massing in the square. We already knew that the surrounding buildings were manned and our position was getting worse as armed men were coming very near the building. When BM returned at 4:30 p.m.47 the situation was almost out of control. A few Indo nesians (I presume local leaders) surrounded BM and they had to push through the crowd to get him near the Bank Building and he once again told me48 that there was a chance for the truce being extended. After he said this 2 or 3 Indonesians made speeches but I could see that the crowd was not going to listen to speeches for long. Mean while BM was being hustled away from the speakers and eventually they too had to stop talking and they were being hustled away in another direction. We soon cleared the square and just as the last people were run ning away we could hear shots being fired into a car (presumably the BMfs car). BM most certainly was not killed by our firing because we stopped as soon as we cleared the armed mob from the veranda and the immediate vicinity of the building. . . .
B e f o r e c o m m e n t i n g on the f o r e g o i n g statements, two further ve r s i o n s of the i ncident w ill be o u t l i n e d in brief.
On N o v e m b e r 1, 1945, over the s i g n a t u r e of Doel A r n o w o , a d o cument e n t i t l e d ''A n n o u n c e m e n t of the S u r a b a y a C ontact B u r e a u " was published. In the final p a r a g r a p h , the c o n c l u s i o n was r eached that:
If in fact Brigadier Mallaby is dead it cannot be ascertained for certain whether his death was caused by firing from the crowd or from Gurkha [sio\ fire. However it is clear that if he is dead it happened in the course of a disturbance caused by firing first start ed by the Gurkhas.
In this disturbance the other members of the Contact Bureau who were in the square bore the same risk. . . . The incident was somewhat confused--as such incidents are--but it took place in and near Union Square in Surabaya. There had been dis cussions about a truce earlier in the day. A large crowd of Indonesians--a mob if you like--had gathered in the square and were in a rather excited state. About 20 Indians, in a building on the other side of the square, had been cut off from telephonic communication and did not know about the truce.53 They were firing sporadically on the mob. Brigadier Mallaby came out from the discussions, walked straight into the crowd, with great courage, and shouted to the In dians to cease fire. They obeyed him. Possibly half an hour later, the mob in the square became turbulent again. Brigadier Mallaby, at a certain point in the proceedings, ordered the Indians to open fire again. They opened fire with two Bren guns and the mob dispersed and went to cover; then fighting broke out again in good earnest. It is apparent that when Brigadier Mallaby gave the order to open fire again, the truce was in fact broken, at any rate locally. Twenty minutes to half an hour after that, he was most unfortunately killed in his car--although even now it is not absolutely certain whether he was killed by Indonesians or by a grenade thrown by an Indian officer at some Indonesians who were approaching his car; which ex ploded simultaneously with the attack on him. W h e n we co m p a r e the a c counts of A b d u l g a n i and C a p t a i n Smith, apart from m i n o r d i s c r e p a n c i e s r e l a t i n g to times, there is a v e r y close s i m i l arity b e t w e e n them. However, r e g a r d i n g M a l l a b y 1s final moments, C a p t a i n Smith has the a d v a n t a g e over A b d u l g a n i in that he was an eyewitness.
It is only in the d e s c r i p t i o n of what h a p p e n e d after the f iring s t a r t e d and
I submit that C a p t a i n Smith is a c r e d i b l e witness.
He is not dogmatic. We m a y r ecall that he wrote:
. . However, in all fairness, I m u s t say that there w e r e m o m e n t s w h e n m y a t t e n t i o n was distracted. . . ."
He also had an acute eye for detail. I understand that a great deal of politics was mixed up in it, but as a military operation, it was a disaster. . . .59
A f t e r w e i g h i n g the e v i d e n c e I am s a t i s f i e d that the answer to Q u e s t i o n 2 is that B r i g a d i e r M a l l a b y was shot by an u n i d e n t i f i e d I n d o n e s i a n .
Question 3. Who^ if anyonej was to blame for Brigadier Mallaby 9s de a t h ?
A b d u l g a n i , r e p r e s e n t i n g the I n d o n e s i a n v i e w point, q uite cl e a r l y lays the bl a m e on M a l l a b y himself.
The o f ficial B r i t i s h v i e w p o i n t , as e x p r e s s e d in the M a n s e r g h Report, is that: Fr o m there the b r i g a d i e r 's r e m a i n s w e r e t r a n s f e r r e d to the War C e m e t e r y at M e n t e n g Pulo, J a k arta, in grave l o c a t i o n VG2.
The h e a d s t o n e reads: 
B r i g a d i e r A. W. S. M a l l a b y , CIE, OBE. 2nd P U N J A B R E G I M E N T 30t h O C T O B E R 1945, A G E 45. MM O R E B RAVE F OR THIS T H A T HE H A T H M U C H TO
The i n f a n t r y of 49 Bde (on w h o m the m a i n b u r d e n of the f i g h t i n g fell) c o n s i s t e d of two b a t t a l i o n s of M a h r a t t a s and one b a t t a l i o n of Rajputs.
The M a h r a t t a R e g i m e n t d raws its m e n from the area arou n d B o m b a y w h i l e the R a j p u t a n a Rifles' r e c r u i t i n g area is in the state of R a j p u t a n a to the north. S p e c i f i c a l l y , the b a t t a l i o n s in v o l v e d wer e 4th B a t t a l i o n , the M a h r a t t a L i ght I n f a n t r y (4 M a h r a t t a ) ; 6th Batt a l i o n , the M a h r a t t a Light I n f a n t r y (6 M a h r a t t a ) ; 5th Battal i o n , R a j p u t a n a R ifles (5 Raj R i f ) . Th e l o cations of these b a t t a l i o n s are s hown on the m a p above. In the D a r m o area to the s o u t h of the town, the m a i n b u r d e n of the f i g h t i n g in d e f e n s e of the D a r mo H o s p i t a l and I n t e rn m e n t Camp area (where m o s t of the D u t c h w o m e n and c h i l d r e n i n t e r n e e s w e r e con c e n t r a t e d ) fell on the m e n of the 5 Raj Ri f and the 3rd I ndian Field A r t i l l e r y Regiment, the latter u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Lt. C o l o n e l Rendall.
B o t h of t h e s e groups have strong m a r t i a l t r a d i tions. T h e r e is no d o u b t that the y s t r o n g l y u p h e l d t heir t r a d i t i o n s in d e s p e r a t e f i g h t i n g a g a i n s t o v e
Col. Rend a l l was able to site m a n y of the r e g i m e n t ' s t w e n t y -f o u r f ield guns w h i c h fired ov e r ope n sights at s e l e c t e d ta r g e t s and c a u s e d m u c h h avoc among the a t t a c k i n g I n d o n e sian forces.
O nce this c o n c e n t r a t i o n of infantry and a r t i l l e r y h ad b e e n e f f e c t e d the D a r m o a rea was n e v e r in any real d a n g e r of b e i n g o v e r r u n . i n
